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TARGETED KILLING AND THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT
Gary Solis
There is no consensus definition of “targeted killing” in the law of armed con-flict or in case law.1 A reasonable definition is: the intentional killing of a
specific civilian who cannot reasonably be apprehended, and who is taking a di-
rect part in hostilities, the targeting done at the direction and authorization of
the state in the context of an international or noninternational armed conflict.
In the second year of the Redland-Blueland war, an armed conflict between two
states, a Redland sniper squeezed the trigger of his rifle, the crosshairs of the
scope unmoving on his target: a uniformed Blueland
soldier. The weapon fired, and five hundred meters
away the enemy combatant fell to the ground, dead.
Was this a “targeted killing”?
The Redland-Blueland war continued. After
months of planning and the training of a team of dis-
affected Redland nationals, Blueland was ready to im-
plement an operation against the enemy. Days later,
two clandestinely inserted Redland nationals, trained
in Blueland and wearing Blueland army uniforms,
planted an explosive charge under a bridge located in-
side Redland. Later, as the limousine of the president
of Redland passed over the bridge, the charge was det-
onated and the target killed. The president, elected to
office when he was a college professor, had been a
thorn in the side of the Blueland government, with his
Gary Solis is a 2006–2007 Scholar in Residence at the
Library of Congress, a U.S. Military Academy professor
of law (retired), and an adjunct professor of law at
Georgetown University Law Center, where he teaches
the law of armed conflict. He is a retired Marine with
twenty-six years’ active duty, including tours in Viet-
nam as an armor officer. He attended law school at the
University of California at Davis, then was a Marine
judge advocate and court-martial judge for eighteen
years. He holds a master of laws degree from George
Washington University. After Marine Corps retirement
he earned a PhD in the law of war from the London
School of Economics and Political Science and taught in
its Law Department for three years. Moving to West
Point in 1996, he initiated the Military Academy’s law
of war program. He retired in 2006. His books are
Marines and Military Law in Vietnam and Son
Thang: An American War Crime. He is writing a law
of war casebook.
Naval War College Review, Spring 2007, Vol. 60, No. 2
C:\WIP\NWCR\NWC Review Spring 2007.vp
Monday, May 14, 2007 3:57:46 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
1
Solis: Targeted Killing and the Law of Armed Conflict
Published by U.S. Naval War College Dig tal Commons, 2007
anti-Blueland rhetoric and verbal attacks on Blueland policies. Now, Blueland’s
most hated critic was dead, silenced by Blueland agents.
Was this a “targeted killing”?
During World War II, in April 1943, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, com-
mander in chief of the Japanese Combined Fleet, was on an inspection tour hun-
dreds of miles behind the front lines. Having broken the Imperial Japanese
Navy’s message code, U.S. forces knew his flight itinerary and sent sixteen Army
Air Forces P-38 Lightning fighter aircraft to intercept him. Near Bougainville, in
the northern Solomons, the American pilots shot down their target, a Betty
bomber, killing all on board, including Admiral Yamamoto.
Was this a “targeted killing”?
First, consider the Redland sniper. On the battlefield the killing of combat-
ants—uniformed members of the army of one of the parties to the conflict—by
opposing combatants is lawful. The sniper, a lawful combatant, killed a lawful
enemy combatant in the course of armed conflict between two high contracting
parties to the Geneva Conventions. To kill the enemy in a lawful manner was the
sniper’s mission; it was expected and required of him. A combatant taking aim at
a human target and then killing him is not what is meant by the term “targeted
killing.” “The [1907] Hague Regulations expressed it more clearly in attributing
the ‘rights and duties of war.’ . . . [A]ll members of the armed forces . . . can par-
ticipate directly in hostilities, i.e., attack and be attacked.”2 1977 Additional Pro-
tocol I, which supplements the 1949 Geneva Conventions, repeats that
formulation.3 The status of “combatant” is crucial, because of the consequences
attached to it. It is the mission of every state’s armed forces—its combatants—to
close with and destroy the enemy. Soldiers who do so are subject to no penalty
for their acts.4 This was not a targeted killing.
The killing of Redland’s president is another matter. He was a civilian and
presumably a noncombatant, not subject to combatant targeting. The leaders of
some states may be considered combatants, however—World War II’s Adolf
Hitler, for example. Saddam Hussein of Iraq, another example, was a combatant
and lawful target, since he customarily wore a military uniform and went armed,
often in the vanguard of Iraqi military units. He decided the tactical and strate-
gic movements of his nation’s military forces. These factors combined to make
him a combatant and a lawful target in time of war.
How about the president of the United States? He is denominated by the Con-
stitution as the “commander in chief ” of the nation’s armed forces. He is the per-
son whom the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff advises. The president is the
final authority for the strategic disposition of U.S. armed forces—“the decider.”5
In time of international armed conflict the president of the United States is a
lawful target for an opposing state’s combatants.
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The United Kingdom’s monarch? The monarch is the honorary colonel in chief
or captain general of many Commonwealth regiments—seventy-one, in the case of
Queen Elizabeth II—and is sometimes in military uniform for ceremonial occa-
sions. But determining if a chief of state is a lawful target is not simply a question of
whether he or she wears a uniform. In this instance, the king or queen exercises no
command of armed forces and has no say in the tactical or strategic disposition of
British forces; those decisions reside in the prime minister and Parliament. The
United Kingdom’s monarch, in uniform or not, is probably not a lawful target.
What little we know of Redland’s president—a noncombatant with no appar-
ent role in directing Redland’s armed forces—suggests that he was not a lawful
target. His killing, even in time of war, even by opposing combatants, was
assassination.
There are many definitions of “assassination,” none universally accepted. The
term does not appear in the 1907 Hague Conventions, 1949 Geneva Conventions,
United Nations Charter, or the Statutes of the International Criminal Courts for
Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Confusingly, the term is used differently in peace and in
armed conflict.6 Assassination in time of armed conflict is “the specific targeting
of a particular individual by treacherous or perfidious means.”7 This wartime def-
inition tracks with that in the law of armed conflict (LOAC): “It is especially for-
bidden . . . to kill or wound treacherously individuals belonging to the hostile
nation or army.”8 In U.S. practice, that language is “construed as prohibiting assas-
sination. . . . It does not, however, preclude attacks on individual soldiers or
officers of the enemy whether in the zone of hostilities, occupied territory, or else-
where.”9 One simplistic but adequate definition of peacetime assassination is the
“murder of a targeted individual for political purposes [or] for political reasons.”10
Former Department of State legal adviser Abraham D. Sofaer has described it simi-
larly: “Any unlawful killing of particular individuals for political purposes.”11
In the domestic law of most states, assassination is considered murder. Michael
Walzer writes, “Political assassins are simply murderers, exactly like the killers of
ordinary citizens. The case is not the same with soldiers, who are not judged polit-
ically at all and who are called murderers only when they kill noncombatants.”12 In
any event, the armed forces of most states are not customarily involved in assassi-
nation, that being left to other government organizations.* The killing of Red-
land’s president was assassination and murder, but it was not a targeted killing.
S O L I S 1 2 9
* An example similar to that described here was the May 1942 assassination of SS Obergruppen-
führer Reinhard Heydrich, the SS chief of security police, deputy chief of the Gestapo, and the person
largely responsible for “the final solution.” He was killed in Prague by two British-trained Czech
soldiers disguised as civilians. Although Heydrich was a lawful combatant target, his combatant
killers engaged in perfidy by disguising themselves as civilians. His killing was an assassination.
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Nor was Admiral Yamamoto’s death a targeted killing. Like the Blueland
sniper’s victim, Yamamoto was a lawful combatant in an international armed
conflict, killed by opposing lawful combatants. “There is nothing treacherous in
singling out an individual enemy combatant (usually, a senior officer) as a target
for a lethal attack conducted by combatants distinguishing themselves as such . . .
even in an air strike.”13 The fact that Yamamoto was targeted away from the front
lines is immaterial. Combatants may be targeted wherever found, armed or un-
armed, awake or asleep, on a front
line or a mile or a hundred miles
behind the lines, “whether in the
zone of hostilities, occupied terri-
tory, or elsewhere.”14 Combatants
can withdraw from hostilities only by retiring and becoming civilians, by be-
coming hors de combat, or by laying down their arms.15 The shooting down of
Admiral Yamamoto was not a targeted killing.
These exclusionary examples indicate that targeted killing is not the battle-
field killing of combatants by opposing combatants. Targeted killing is not the
assassination of an individual, military or civilian, combatant or noncombatant,
for political purposes. What is an example of targeted killing, then?
On 3 November 2002, over the desert near Sanaa, Yemen, a Central Intelli-
gence Agency–controlled Predator drone aircraft tracked an SUV containing six
men. One of the six, Qaed Salim Sinan al-Harethi, was known to be a senior
al-Qa‘ida lieutenant suspected of having played a major role in the 2000 bomb-
ing of the destroyer USS Cole. He “was on a list of ‘high-value’ targets whose
elimination, by capture or death, had been called for by President Bush.”16 The
United States and Yemen had tracked al-Harethi’s movements for months. Now,
away from any inhabited area, the Predator fired a Hellfire missile at the vehicle.
The six occupants, including al-Harethi, were killed.17
That was a targeted killing. In today’s new age of nonstate actors engaging in
transnational terrorist violence, targeting parameters must change. Laws of
armed conflict agreed upon in another era should be interpreted to recognize
the new reality. While some will disagree, the killing of al-Harethi should be
considered as being in accord with the law of armed conflict.
SELF-DEFENSE
The justification for targeted killing rests in the assertion of self-defense. Israel
argues that “it is the prime duty of a democratic state to effectively defend its cit-
izens against any danger posed to their lives and well-being by acts or activities
of terror.”18 In the United States, the preamble of the Constitution includes the
words, “in order to . . . provide for the common defense.” A prominent Israeli
1 3 0 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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scholar argues, “It may be contended that the right of self-defence is inherent
not in jus naturale, but in the sovereignty of States.”19 In 2004, the United States
initiated an aggressive military-based strategy against suspected terrorists, no
longer taking a law enforcement approach to their capture and trial.20
An argument against a state’s assertion of self-defense as legal justification is
that “this type of practice [targeted killing] is incompatible with international
law, which categorically prohibits extra-judicial executions.”21 Indeed, 1907
Hague Regulation IV notes, “It is especially forbidden . . . to declare that no
quarter will be given.”22 Human rights organizations say that “suspected terror-
ists should be detained and put on trial before they can lawfully be punished for
their actions. . . . To kill under these circumstances is simply execution—but car-
ried out without any trial or proof of guilt.”23 The International Committee of
the Red Cross says, “Any order of liquidation is prohibited, whether it concerns
commandos . . . irregular troops or so-called irregular troops . . . or other cases. It
is not only the order to put them to death that is prohibited, but also the threat
and the execution, with or without orders.”24 The prohibition on targeting non-
combatant civilians is considered customary law.25 Some of these objections
presume the employment of a law enforcement model in combating terrorists.
But that model is irrelevant to targeted killing, which employs military means to
target enemy civilian combatants, albeit unlawful combatants,* during an
armed conflict. “The problem with the law-enforcement model in the context of
transnational terror is that one of its fundamental premises is invalid: that the
suspected perpetrator is within the jurisdiction of the law-enforcement authori-
ties in the victim state, so that an arrest can be effected.”26
Even in the law enforcement model an individual—or in this case, a state—
may defend itself from attack, a state’s right to defend itself being embedded in
the Charter of the United Nations. Nor are terrorists, particularly those in leader-
ship roles, easily detained for trial.
THE ISRAELI VIEW
Israel has openly engaged in targeted killing since September 2000 and the sec-
ond intifada.27 Even before then, Gerald V. Bull, a Canadian civilian artillery ex-
pert, was in the pay of Iraq and well along in building an artillery “supergun”
capable of firing a 1,300-pound projectile six hundred miles. From the gun’s lo-
cation in Iraq, Israel would be an easy target. In March 1990, individuals
S O L I S 1 3 1
* An unlawful combatant is one who takes an active and continuous part in armed conflict who
therefore should be treated as a combatant in that he/she is a lawful target of attack, not enjoying
the protections granted civilians. Because unlawful combatants do not differentiate themselves
from civilians and do not obey the laws of armed conflict they are not entitled to the privileges of
combatants, for example, prisoner-of-war status.
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believed but never proven to be Israeli agents murdered Bull as he entered his
Paris apartment.
In 1996, a notorious Hamas bomb maker known as “The Engineer,” Yehiya
Ayash, was killed when he answered a cell phone booby-trapped by the Israelis.28 His
targeted killing was celebrated throughout Israel, but it also initiated a series of re-
taliatory suicide bombings that killed more than sixty Israelis. In 2000, helicopter-
fired missiles killed a Palestinian Fatah leader and deputy of Yasir Arafat; an
Israeli general said, “He’s not shooting at us yet, but he’s on his way.”29 In 2001,
Israeli helicopters fired missiles into the West Bank offices of Hamas, killing
eight.30 Later, in 2002, in Gaza, Salah Shehade, the civilian founder and leader of
Hamas’s military wing and an individual said by the Israelis to be responsible for
hundreds of noncombatant deaths, was targeted. In predawn hours an Israeli
F-16 fighter jet dropped a one-ton bomb on the three-story apartment building
where Shehade was sleeping. He was killed, along with fourteen others asleep in
the building, including nine children. One hundred and seventy were reportedly
wounded.31
Among the most notable of Israel’s targeted killings was that of the wheelchair-
bound Sheik Ahmed Yassin, the cofounder of Hamas and its spiritual leader. He
was reputedly involved in authorizing terrorist actions against Jews. In March
2004, he was killed by helicopter-fired Hellfire missiles, along with two body-
guards and eight bystanders. Another fifteen were wounded. “The Bush adminis-
tration felt constrained . . . to say it was ‘deeply troubled’ by Israel’s action, though
later it vetoed a UN Security Council resolution condemning the action.”32
These Israeli actions were not taken in a vacuum, of course. Israeli noncom-
batants have been victims of countless terrorist attacks; Israel has been involved
in numerous international armed conflicts with states employing terrorism, as
well as with individual civilians whom Israel later targeted.
The LOAC problem with the Israeli view is summed up in the general’s
phrase, “He’s not shooting at us yet, but he’s on his way.” The civilian target is
presumed to intend direct participation in hostilities. Professor Yoram Dinstein,
an Israeli and a foremost LOAC scholar, writes, “attack[s] (which may cause death,
injury and suffering) are banned only on condition that the persons concerned do
not abuse their exempt status. When persons belonging to one of the categories
selected for special protection—for instance, women and children—take an active
part in hostilities, no immunity from an ordinary attack can be invoked.”33
Early in the U.S. conflict against Iraq, Forward, a Jewish daily newspaper, mix-
ing assassination and targeted killing, reported:
The Bush administration has been seeking Israel’s counsel on creating a legal justifi-
cation for the assassination of terrorism suspects. . . . American representatives were
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anxious to learn details of the legal work that Israeli government jurists have done . . .
to tackle possible challenges—both domestic and international—to its policy of “tar-
geted killings” of terrorist suspects. . . . Unlike Israel, which went public in November
2000 with its assassination policy, the Bush administration . . . officially is opposed to
such assassinations and does not acknowledge that it engages in such actions.34
With the widely reported November 2002 targeted killing of al-Harethi,
American deniability of the tactic’s use faded, along with American criticism of
Israel’s tactic. The question is whether the United States shares Israel’s broad
view of when a terrorist is a lawful target.
THE AMERICAN VIEW
Although there were dissenters, the United States and much of the Western press
was initially critical of the Israeli practice.35 As early as 1991, however, former
president Richard Nixon said that were he still in the White House he would or-
der the assassination of Saddam Hussein.36 In 2001, the American ambassador
to Israel, Martin Indyk, scolded, “The United States government is very clearly
on record as against targeted assassinations. . . . They are extra-judicial killings
and we do not support that.”37 Yet, in 1989, Abraham Sofaer, State Department
legal adviser, equivocated: “While the U.S. regards attacks on terrorists being
protected in the sovereign territory of other States as potentially justifiable when
undertaken in self-defense, a State’s ability to establish the legality of such an ac-
tion depends on its willingness openly to accept responsibility for the attack, to
explain the basis for its action, and to demonstrate that reasonable efforts were
made prior to the attack to convince the State whose territorial sovereignty was
violated to prevent the offender’s unlawful activities from occurring.”38 In Au-
gust 1998, still viewing lethal attacks on individual targets as assassination, a
U.S. presidential finding allowed the targeting of Osama Bin Laden, seen as the
force behind the bombing of American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.39 The
United States fired a volley of cruise missiles at an Afghan training compound
linked to Bin Laden, saying, “That prerogative arises from a fundamental right
of national self-defense.”40
The 2002 killing of al-Harethi in Yemen attracted dissenters, but by then the
United States had found targeted killing a useful weapon in the “war on terror-
ism.”41 The killing of al-Harethi had “shift[ed] the war on terrorism into a new
gear.”42 The U.S. change of stance was described as reflecting a broader defini-
tion of the battlefield upon which the war on terrorism was being fought. Later,
the right of national self-defense was also proffered as justification for targeting
individuals associated with terrorist groups, as well as self-defense under article
51 of the United Nations Charter.43 Under a series of classified presidential find-
ings, President Bush broadened the number of specifically named terrorists who
S O L I S 1 3 3
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may be killed if their capture is impractical.44 In June 2006, the targeted killing of
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, leader of al-Qa‘ida in Iraq, was celebrated as a strategic
and political victory.
In early 2006, it was reported that since 9/11 the United States had success-
fully carried out at least nineteen targeted killings via Predator-fired Hellfire
missiles. “The Predator strikes have killed at least four senior al-Qa‘ida leaders,
but also many civilians, and it is not known how many times they missed their
targets.”45 The question of whether America shares Israel’s broad view of when a
civilian terrorist is a lawful target has not yet been clearly answered. Further U.S.
attacks will reveal America’s policy.
DOMESTIC LAW
A killing in the name of the state must be based upon, or at least not in contra-
vention of, the state’s domestic law. Targeted killing is not contrary to U.S. law.
The Constitution’s Fifth Amendment, which protects any person from depri-
vation of life without due process, is not in play. Recent federal case law holds
that the Fifth Amendment does not prohibit American agents from torturing
foreign nationals abroad. The same reasoning would appear to apply to targeted
killing, the court hypothesizes.46 More to the point, federal law authorizes the
use of U.S. military force to “defend the national security of the United States
against the continuing threat posed by Iraq.”47 Additionally, Congress has autho-
rized the use of “all necessary and appropriate force” against those who carried
out the September 11th attacks and all who aided them and “to prevent future
acts of international terrorism against the United States.”48
As long as the targeted killing is related to the continuing threat against U.S.
forces in Iraq, or is focused on those involved in the 9/11 attack or on those who
aided or harbored them, or is intended to prevent future acts of terrorism
against the United States, it does not violate U.S. domestic law and is in accord
with Congress’s authorizations of force.
CHARACTERISTICS OF TARGETED KILLING
The 1949 Geneva Conventions are silent on targeted killing and who might con-
stitute a lawful target. There is no announced American policy directive regard-
ing targeted killing. Assassination is addressed in Executive Order 12333, which
does not prohibit killing absolutely but does require presidential approval,
which the president may give in secret or otherwise. But assassination and tar-
geted killing are different acts. Given that there is no official protocol, one looks
to LOAC for guidelines for the execution of a targeted killing.
First, an international or noninternational conflict must be in progress.
Without an ongoing armed conflict the targeted killing of a civilian, terrorist or
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not, would be assassination—a homicide and a domestic crime. Moreover, “IHL
[international humanitarian law, or LOAC] can only be applicable when the ter-
rorists are involved in an existing international or internal armed conflict, or
when the conflict between a state and a terrorist group within its territory rises
to the level of an armed conflict.”49 If one contests the view that an armed con-
flict is ongoing, the lawfulness of any targeted killing is necessarily contested as
well. It is the predicate armed conflict that raises the right to kill an enemy.
Second, the victim must be a specific civilian. Obviously, civilian victims may
not be random targets. They must be selected by reason of their activities in rela-
tion to the armed conflict in progress. Were the identified civilians lawful com-
batants, uniformed and openly armed, they would be opposing combatants’
lawful targets, with no further
discussion merited. On the other
hand, it is clear that noncombat-
ants may not be lawfully tar-
geted.50 But civilians who take up
arms may be. A vital distinction, then, is that between a “civilian” and a “non-
combatant.” The two terms are often conflated; such descriptive carelessness is
usually irrelevant, but not in this case. The targeted civilian must be a civilian
unlawful combatant.
A civilian is any person not belonging to one of the categories referred to in
Geneva Convention III who is eligible for prisoner-of-war status upon capture.51
As Additional Protocol I points out, “Civilians shall enjoy the protection af-
forded by this Section [General Protection against Effects of Hostilities], unless
and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.”52 In other words, a ci-
vilian who injects himself directly into ongoing hostilities violates the basic con-
cept of distinction and becomes something other than a noncombatant. He
forfeits civilian immunity and becomes a lawful target. “For instance, a driver
delivering ammunition to combatants and a person who gathers military intelli-
gence in enemy-controlled territory are commonly acknowledged to be actively
taking part in hostilities. . . . [A] person cannot (and is not allowed to) be both a
combatant and a civilian at the same time, nor can he constantly shift from one
status to the other.”53
Only a specific civilian may be singled out for targeted killing. If an unaffili-
ated gathering of civilians is targeted it is unlikely (although possible) that all
will have violated the distinction above and thereby made lawful targets of
themselves and the entire group, or that all will have shared equally in the unlaw-
ful participation in hostilities. Were it otherwise, the forfeiture of immunity by
one member of a group’s taking a direct role in fighting would render all group
members targets. A critical exception is groups—terrorists, for example—
S O L I S 1 3 5
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whose membership as a whole is dedicated to active engagement in unlawful
combatancy.
Third, the individual who has engaged directly in hostilities, the unlawful
combatant, must be beyond possible arrest by the targeting state. Since the focus
of U.S. targeted killing is on noncitizens abroad, where the United States has no
arrest authority, the issue does not arise. Presumably, neither would an allied
state be in a position to make an arrest. U.S. constitutional issues, such as proba-
ble cause, do not arise when noncitizens abroad are targeted. If capture is possi-
ble, however, that option must be exercised. The status of previously targeted
civilians would be that of arrestees, subject to interrogation and trial for the
precapture acts that rendered them unlawful combatants.54 They fit none of the
various criteria for prisoner-of-war status contained in 1949 Geneva Conven-
tion III.55
Fourth, only a senior military commander, as a representative of the targeting
state, may authorize a targeted killing. Of course, the authorizing individual may
also be the president or a senior government official to whom the president has
delegated targeting authority, such as the secretary of defense or the director of
the Central Intelligence Agency.
THE AUTHORIZING DECISION
Under current directives, the president’s personal approval for specific opera-
tions is reportedly not required for persons already designated by him as poten-
tial targets.56 “As commander in chief, the President has the constitutional
authority to command the use of deadly force by troops in war, whether it has
been declared by Congress or thrust upon us by enemy attack or invasion.”57
Once beyond targets authorized by the president, what level of military com-
mander may authorize a targeted killing on behalf of the United States? Army
commanders? Battalion commanders? Press reports indicate that in Israel such
decisions must be approved by “senior cabinet members,” which apparently
translates to the prime minister.58 For the United States, the decision to carry out
a targeted killing, with its potential political repercussions, should be made, if
not by the president, only by the most senior military officers. The four-star
commanders of the five geographically defined unified U.S. commands (North-
ern Command, Southern Command, Central Command, Pacific Command,
and European Command) seem the lowest-ranking military officers who should
be delegated such authority.59
The military commander’s initial consideration is military necessity: Is the
planned action indispensable for securing the submission of the enemy? The
death of no one person will end global terrorism, but would the killing of this
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particular target constitute a substantial injury to its cause or seriously disrupt
its plans?
High among the commander’s considerations is collateral damage.60 Collat-
eral damage, like proportionality and unnecessary suffering, is a difficult issue
allowing for lenient judgment and moral assessment. In 2002, the Israeli chief of
military intelligence, haunted by civilian deaths in killings he had overseen,
asked a mathematician to write a formula to determine the number of accept-
able civilian casualties per dead terrorist. Unsurprisingly, the effort was unsuc-
cessful.61 Each proposed targeted killing raises its own unique considerations
and moral dilemmas. There are no preconceived solutions.
DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES
The lawfulness of targeted killing turns on interpretation of the term “direct
participation in hostilities.” As 1977 Additional Protocol I specifies, civilians are
not lawful targets “unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostili-
ties.”62 For Israel, such activities reportedly include “persons recruiting certain
other persons to carry out acts or activities of terror” and “developing and oper-
ating funding channels that are crucial to acts or activities of terror,” among
other definitions.63 These are broad definitions of direct participation in hostili-
ties. Professor Raphael Cohen-Almagor, director of the Center for Democratic
Studies at the University of Haifa, holds that “Israel has the right and duty to kill
these terrorists. . . . Furthermore, it is justified to kill chiefs of terrorist opera-
tions who plan and orchestrate murderous attacks.”64 Professor Robert K.
Goldman of American University’s Washington College of Law offers a U.S.-
centric viewpoint, saying, “The basic premise is that the U.S. regards itself as at
war with al-Qa‘ida. That being the case, it regards members of al-Qa‘ida as com-
batants engaged in war against the U.S.”65 Is mere membership in al-Qa‘ida
enough to make a member a target wherever and whenever he may be found, or
is something more required?
The civilian driver delivering ammunition to combatants and the civilian
gathering military intelligence in enemy-controlled territory are arguably ac-
tively participating in hostilities. But when does their participation end? May
the driver be targeted after he has returned to his starting point and walked away
from the truck? May he be targeted when he is being toasted in the mess, late that
evening? The next day? What if he were driving an ammunition truck miles away
from the scene of any combat activity? May the intelligence gatherer be killed be-
fore he actually embarks on his task? Is a civilian POW-camp guard directly par-
ticipating in hostilities? A civil defense worker who directs military traffic
through his town? A civilian clearing land mines placed by the enemy? Is a civil-
ian seated in the Pentagon, controlling an armed Predator over Iraq, directly
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participating in hostilities? The United States authorizes the arming of civilian
defense contract workers in combat zones, and they “may be authorized to pro-
vide security services.”66 Are they directly participating in hostilities?
But these conundrums, relating to civilians of no particular political import
or military significance, do not describe the probable targeted killing candidate
in a war on terrorism. More apropos, when is Pakistan’s al-Qa‘ida coordinator a
civilian, and when is he an unlawful combatant “directly participating in hostili-
ties”? Only when he is actually engaged in a firefight with American or Pakistani
forces? Only when he is actively directing terrorist activities? Or, by virtue of his
leadership position, is he not always a legitimate target—when asleep, or when
playing with his children? In 2002, was the senior al-Qa‘ida lieutenant,
al-Harethi, who planned the bombing of the USS Cole, a lawful target while he
was on the move in Yemen, fighting no one, formulating no terrorist plan? Israel
takes the view that enemy leaders, including strategists who plan and advise, and
technical experts are not foot soldiers in the army of unlawful combatants and
that they are always legitimate targets, wherever they may be, whatever activity
they are engaged in, and require no warning of attack.
Civilians are protected unless they take a direct part in hostilities, and only for
such time as they do. Professor Antonio Cassese writes, “When civilians taking a
direct part in hostilities lay down their arms, they reacquire noncombatant im-
munity and may not be made objects of attack although they are amenable to
prosecution for unlawfully participating in hostilities (war crimes).”67 But, one
may argue, by virtue of their positions, civilians who lead terrorist groups sel-
dom literally pick up arms and so, metaphorically, never lay them down. As Brig-
adier General Kenneth Watkin, judge advocate general of Canada’s armed
forces, says, “It is not just the fighters with weapons in their hands that pose a
threat.”68
Not all law of war scholars agree that terrorists may be targeted only when ac-
tually engaged in terrorist activities:
If we accept this narrow interpretation, terrorists enjoy the best of both worlds—they
can remain civilians most of the time and only endanger their protection as civilians
while actually in the process of carrying out a terrorist act. Is this theory, which has
been termed the revolving door theory, tenable? . . . Another argument is that a
“combatant-like” approach based on membership in the military wing of a group in-
volved in hostilities, rather than on individual actions, should be adopted in deciding
whether persons may be targeted. If we adopt the restricted theory, according to which
international terrorists are civilians who may only be targeted while taking a direct
part in hostilities, the right of self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter . . . may
become meaningless.69
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Is the civilian cofounder of Hamas, Ahmed Yassin—half-blind, paralyzed, and
wheelchair-bound, killed as he left morning prayers at a local mosque—immune
from attack because he was engaged in innocent activity at the moment of his
death? Is Yehiya Ayash, the civilian who constructed diabolically effective bombs
but led no combatants, gave neither orders nor instructions, who acted only as a
fabricator of tools of insurgency, a lawful target only when actually constructing a
bomb? A combatant general—for example, Dwight Eisenhower during World
War II—is by virtue of his position of command and authority a legitimate target
whenever and wherever he can be found by enemy combatants. Eisenhower,
whether in London or Kansas, in civilian clothes or uniform, was always on duty,
always an Allied commander, and could have been lawfully killed by any Axis
combatant. Should civilian terrorist leaders, and terrorists with critical war-
making skills, be free from the same threat by consciously avoiding lawful
combatancy? Should not they, like the uniformed lawful combatants they target,
be considered legitimate targets whenever and wherever they are found? It is rea-
sonable that “the effect of the ‘temporal’ wording found in Article 51(3) of Addi-
tional Protocol I is significantly more limited than commonly believed.”70
Columbia University School of Law professor George Fletcher points out:
This phrase “direct part” conjures up a picture of someone picking up a gun and
aiming it at the enemy. But . . . ordinary principles of self-defence apply against people
pointing guns, whether they are civilians or not. Targeted assassinations are usually
aimed at the organizers of terrorist attacks—not those who are aiming weapons. . . .
The targets are the key figures behind the scenes who organize the suicide bombings,
the hijacking and other terrorist activities. Are they “taking direct part in hostilities”?
I think the phrase lends itself to this construction.71
Two hundred years ago, the great eighteenth-century legal scholar Emerich de
Vattel wrote, “Assassins and incendiaries by profession, are not only guilty in re-
spect to the particular victims of their violences, but likewise of the state to
which they are declared enemies. All nations have a right to join in punishing,
suppressing, and even exterminating these savages.”72
One may ask: If civilian terrorist leaders and terrorists with critical skills may
be targeted, why not all terrorists? If it is lawful for some to be killed, is it not law-
ful for all to be killed? Logic compels a positive response: yes, it is lawful for all
terrorists potentially to be subject to targeted killing, regardless of their posi-
tions or “duties.” But logic and practicality similarly dictate that only senior
leaders and particularly dangerous specialists in groups dedicated to unlawful
combatancy be singled out for targeted killing. The availability of resources—
Predator drones and laser-directed munitions, for example—will severely limit
the number of terrorists who may be targeted. The availability of mission
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planners and support personnel—intelligence officers and agents, communica-
tions analysts, and interpreters—is similarly limiting. Just as in past wars, in which
only senior combatants—Isoroku Yamamoto, Dwight Eisenhower, Bernard
Montgomery, and Erwin Rommel—could be singled out for the demanding ef-
fort required for their targeting, so it would inevitably be for today’s terrorists.
Finally, the judgment and reason of the senior leaders permitted to authorize
targeted killing would also act as a natural brake upon the tactic.
That is not to say that a terrorist is a target for life. A soldier is a lawful target
only so long as he or she remains a soldier. Soldiers who have retired from armed
service and, in the words of 1949 Geneva Convention common article 3, “mem-
bers of armed forces who have laid down their arms” are no longer combatants
or lawful targets. A civilian terrorist who lays down his arms or, more signifi-
cantly, lays down his arms and departs the combat zone would no longer be a le-
gitimate target. Again, the reason and judgment of those authorized to order
targeted killing would act as a brake upon targeting simple terrorist apostates.
Determining an individual’s “direct participation” should not be confused
with testing for lawfully targeting objects.73 The criteria for targeting “people”
and “objects” differ. Direct participation remains the thorniest issue in targeted
killing, something that states and their political leaders and military command-
ers must resolve in each case, recalling that their resolutions may eventually be
under international review. The law of armed conflict boldly states the criteria
for targeting but does not clearly apply its criteria to kaleidoscopic real-world
situations.
ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES
Killing senior terrorists, expert bomb makers, and those who provide philo-
sophical guidance for terrorists may spare countless noncombatant victims
while, at the same time, forgoing risk to friendly combatant forces. A successful
targeted killing removes a dangerous enemy from the battlefield and deprives the
foe of his leadership, guidance, and experience. The targeted killing of terrorist
leaders leaves subordinates confused and in disarray, however temporarily. Suc-
cessors will feel trepidation, knowing they too may be in the enemy’s sights. Tar-
geted killing unbalances terrorist organizations, making them concerned with
protecting their own membership and diverting them from their goals.
But targeting mistakes are made, whether the intended victim is killed one on
one or by missiles.74 In 1973, in Lillehammer, Norway, Israeli Mossad agents
murdered a Moroccan waiter they mistook for a Palestinian involved in killing
Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics the year before.75 On the Pakistan-
Afghanistan border in February 2002, a U.S. Predator tracked and killed a tall in-
dividual in flowing robes believed to be Osama Bin Laden. He was not.76 Tactical
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situations may change in the moments between the order to fire and impact—
women and children enter the impact area, the target moves to cover. Stuff does
happen.77
Innocent bystanders are often killed in targeted killings. Crowded city streets,
even isolated houses, inevitably yield “collateral damage.” Are the anticipated
deaths proportional? What level of probable noncombatant lethality is accept-
able? “An extremely strong case has to be made to justify an attack on suspected
terrorists when it is likely, not to mention inevitable, that the attack will cause
the death of civilians. After all[,] . . . the military advantages to be gained by tar-
geting them are based largely on speculation.”78 Does a more significant targeted
individual justify a greater potential number of innocent deaths? Does the possi-
ble death of Osama Bin Laden justify the probable deaths of five bystanders?
Ten? Fifty? In January 2006, in the village of Damadola, Afghanistan, seventeen
Afghans died in a futile U.S. missile strike on several houses. The attack was
aimed at al-Qa‘ida deputy Ayman Zawahiri.79 American commanders appar-
ently thought the risk of multiple noncombatant deaths was outweighed by the
possibility of killing Zawahiri.
Targeted killings may prove counterproductive, in that they can instigate
greater violence in revenge or retaliation. “I hope it will reduce the violence and
bring back reason to this area,” an Israeli major general said in 2000 after three
missiles killed a Palestinian leader and two middle-aged female bystanders.80 In-
stead, the killings touched off a week of the most intense fighting seen in that
round of the conflict.
In a world where the enemy has missiles too, a targeted killing by the United
States “makes every American official both here and in the Middle East a target
of opportunity.”81 If an expanded interpretation of who constitutes a legitimate
civilian candidate for targeted killing is accepted, we must accept that our own
nonuniformed leaders and weapons specialists will become legitimate targets.
“The United States and countries that follow its [targeted killing] example must
be prepared to accept the exploitation of the new policy by adversaries who will
not abide by the standards of proof or evidential certainty adhered to by Western
democracies.”82 Some believe the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie,
Scotland, on 21 December 1988, killing 270, was Muammar Qaddafi’s revenge
for the 1986 U.S. bombing of his Libyan home that killed his fifteen-month-old
daughter.83 “Many past and present military and intelligence officials have ex-
pressed alarm at the Pentagon policy about targeting Al Qaeda members. Their
concerns have less to do with the legality of the program than with its wisdom,
its ethics, and, ultimately, its efficacy.”84
It is argued that civilian victims of targeted killing, not afforded an opportu-
nity to surrender, are deprived of due process and denied the “inherent right to
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life.”85 The victim is unable to contest that he is a terrorist, seek judicial review, or
lodge an appeal; no legal assessment of the legality of the targeting is available.86
But these objections accompany the initial question of direct participation in
hostilities; if an individual is directly involved in hostilities, he forfeits noncom-
batant immunity and becomes a lawful target. Soldiers engaged in armed con-
flict are not afforded due-process rights. Even away from the battlefield,
“deprivation of life shall not be regarded as a violation of the right to life when it
results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary in . . .
defence of any person from unlawful violence.”87 If considered a case of propor-
tional self-defense, targeted killing would not violate the right to life off the
battlefield.
With the limitations discussed here, targeted killing is within the bounds of law
of armed conflict. Terrorists should not be permitted the shield of Additional
Protocol I, article 51.3. This conclusion requires a broader interpretation of arti-
cle 51.3, granting civilians targeting immunity except when they are directly
participating in hostilities, than is currently universally accepted. But expansive
interpretations of treaty provisions are not novel. (Although the United States
has not ratified Additional Protocol I, article 51.3 is widely considered an ex-
pression of customary law.) Dean Anne-Marie Slaughter, of Princeton Univer-
sity’s Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs and a former
president of the American Society of International Law, argues that the United
Nations should itself target individuals identified by the Security Council as
murderous despots. (She adds, however, “Such a course would never be accept-
able, if undertaken by a single nation.”)88 Still, LOAC is not contravened if a tar-
geted killing is carried out by a nation acting within the parameters described
here. In U.S. law, and in the law of armed conflict, the targeting killing of civil-
ians taking a direct part in hostilities, while they are taking a direct part, is not
forbidden. The issue is in deciding what constitutes “a direct part.” As always, the
devil is in the details.
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